A Free Syrian Army soldier fires his machine gun against Syrian Army positions in the Izaa district of Aleppo on Saturday. AP Photo
A Free Syrian Army soldier fires his machine gun against Syrian Army positions in the Izaa district of Aleppo on Saturday. AP Photo
Syria’s significant neighbours from Iran and Turkey to deadly hostile Israel, Saudi Arabia and Gulf States are pretty well used to the resilience and surprising tenacity of Bashar-Al Assad to hold on amid crises. The redoubtable Syrian president owes much to the attainment by his father of the country’s three strategic goals i.e. consolidating internal authority turning Syria’s difficult geography into a source of national relevance and using its limited power potentials in achieving them. Today with the country’s internal unrest and two years’ old fierce civil war this strategic stability is in jeopardy. Also the country is exposed to external predatory ambitions, sectarian intervention and attempts to changes the country’s strategic orientation.

In this game the reactions of Syria’s neighbours vary considerably keeping in views the best of their national interests. Obviously those reactions negate not only Syria’s interest, but also its traditional advantages. However, Iran, Syria’s brother in arm is already mobilising resources to prevent Assad’s fall. As international diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis stall a few but committed allies come to Assad’s rescue, the prominent being Iran.

Iran, more than any other country stands to lose from regime change in Syria. The two government ruling both these countries are locked in a force-multiplying alliance that has resisted difference in outlook and repeated courting of Arab and Western countries. But Burhan Ghalioun, the head of the main Syrian opposition group, has however rejected those notions being irrational and distorted information.

But breaking this exceptional relationship means breaking their existing strategic military alliance. The prospect of a strategically and politically hostile government in Damascus in consequence alarms Iranian leaders who also see the uprising against an ally as the part of a broad sustained campaign to weaken the both. The stakes involved are almost equal for Tehran and Damascus although Iran is threatened in the short term.

That’s why Tehran extended political and material support for Assad regime including helping Syria perpetuate repression, circumvent sanction, monitor internet traffic, shore up currency and economy but gestured at the best a clumsy outreach to the Syrian opposition especially its Islamist faction to broker a compromise with Assad regime. But such hypocritical calls obviously failed as many Syrians now perceive Iran as an active enabler of the repression rather than a champion of the weak or oppressed. Iran’s pro- Assad stance has eroded its image and appeal across the region and spawned accusation of sectarian behaviour.

Nevertheless Iran is not threatened in the short term. A weakened but, combative Assad embroiled in a civil war would still accommodate Tehran’s interests. Iran has much experience and expertise in thriving in difficult environments. In Lebanon, Iraq and Afghanistan it successfully cultivated allies and unlikely proxies to remain relevant and maximise its leaverage.

Syria itself is however a vital enabler of Iran’s ambitions in eastern Mediterranean and a precious Arab ally. Without it Hizbollah, Iran’s ultimate instrument of deterrence and coercion against Israeli would lose valuable strategic depth and find itself stuck in Lebanon’s muddy politics and unable to perform its primary function. Iran would also lose its Arab entry point into Palestinian politics.

Such a strategic and ideological setback on the party of Iran could force Tehran to engage in an introspection. Debate might arise among Iranian strategists about the wisdom of propping up costly and unstable proxies. That could lead to greater investment in indigenous defence and deterrence including the country’s nuclear program or reorienting her attention and resources to the country’s immediate neighbourhood -- fortifying its presence in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Gulfs.

But even in that eventuality Iran’s relevance in the Levant diminish much. If Assad would be able to hold even a comparatively weak Syria it can confront Israel in Golan Heights through Hisbollah and Palestinian factions in coordination with Iran.

Brig (retd) M Abdul Hafiz is a former DG of BIISS.